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IN  THE  FIRST  QUARTER  OF  1970, unemployment  in the United States 
rose to 4 percent  of the labor  force,  the presumed  full employment  target. 
By the first quarter  of 1971,  unemployment  reached  the undesirable  level 
of nearly  6 percent.  Over  this  same  one-year  period,  imports  into  the  United 
States increased  by $4 billion (1971:1 over 1970:1  at annual  rates) and 
exports  increased  by only $3 billion,  reducing  the  net positive  trade  balance 
by $1 billion.  An increase  of competitive  imports-considered  in isolation 
-has  the direct  consequence  of reducing  job opportunities.  A reduction  of 
exports  has a similar  job-destruction  effect.  By the same  token,  a reduction 
of imports  and an increase  of exports  have the opposite  consequence  on 
job opportunities.  In view of the trade development,  a seemingly  natural 
question  is how much  of current  unemployment  did we import?' 
Actually  the question  is not as natural  as it appears  because  interna- 
tional trade cannot be considered  in isolation from other economic  de- 
velopments.  In an efficiently  evolving  dynamic  economy,  job opportunities 
are constantly  being  lost because  of many  factors,  but the losses are more 
than offset by job-creating  developments.  Shifts in consumer  demand, 
changes  in productive  technology,  restructuring  of government  expendi- 
1. Some observers  have already  given  their  answers  to it. See, for example,  AFL-CIO, 
Industrial  Union Department,  Crisis:  Imports  vs.  Jobs  (Viewpoint,  Vol. 1, Summer  1971). 
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tures,  as well  as increases  in imports,  cause  unemployment  among  domestic 
workers  whose  product  is no longer  needed.  General  unemployment  need 
not occur,  however,  as long as aggregate  demand  is maintained  in the econ- 
omy, if need be through  governmental  policy. In the particular  events  of 
1970-71,  full  employment  was  not maintained  and,  therefore,  the contribu- 
tion of the decline  of net exports  to the increase  in unemployment  becomes 
meaningful.  To be sure,  the employment  effects  of the decline  of net exports 
could have been offset by appropriate  fiscal stimulation,  but it can be 
argued  that trade  movements  are relatively  unpredictable  and, therefore, 
some unintended  unemployment  may have resulted. 
It is not legitimate,  however,  to count the entire  decline  in net exports 
since 1964 as a cause of current  unemployment.  Up to 1970, displaced 
workers  in the aggregate  were  absorbed  elsewhere  in the economy  and  did 
not create  an unemployment  problem  as such.  Indeed,  while  the trade  bal- 
ance  was declining  from $6.8  billion  in 1964  to $0.7 billion  in 1969,  unem- 
ployment  also declined  from 5.2 percent  to 3.5 percent. 
In addition  to the issue  of total  employment,  the economic  welfare  of the 
society  depends  on what  kind of job opportunities  are  created  in exchange 
for  those  being  destroyed.  When  specific  jobs are  lost through  technological 
change,  for instance,  there  is a presumption  that economic  welfare  is im- 
proved  even though  the workers  actually  displaced  may not find equally 
remunerative  work. A similar  presumption,  based on the theory  of com- 
parative advantage,  exists concerning  disturbances  arising from inter- 
national  trade.  Society's  welfare  should  improve  even  though  the individ- 
uals displaced  may suffer  a loss. This  presumption,  however,  is dependent 
on the country's  having an equilibrium  exchange  rate. An overvalued 
exchange  rate would not directly  prevent  a country from reaching  full 
employment;  but at full employment,  resource  utilization  would be dis- 
torted away  from tradable  goods toward  nontradable  goods and services 
with resulting  welfare  loss for the world  as a whole. 
Methodology 
The purpose  of this exercise  is to obtain  an estimate  of the employment 
consequences  of the decline  in U.S. net exports  between  the first  quarter  of 
1970  and  the first  quarter  of 1971,  the period  in which  unemployment  rose. 
The  first  step  in the estimation  process  was  to record  the changes  in exports 
and imports  at annual  rates. Because  different  products  have widely  dif- Lawrence  B. Krause  and  John  A. Mathieson  419 
ferent  labor  inputs,  some  disaggregation  was required.  Since  the intention 
is to relate  trade  changes  to employment  levels, the classification  scheme 
utilized  in employment  reports  was  adopted  as shown  in Tables  1, 2, and  3.2 
The  trade  statistics  were  taken  from  the Census  report  by end-use  categories 
and  aggregated  to reach  the proper  classification.3  The  trade  data  are  given 
in Table  1,  with  exports  and  imports  shown  separately.  Since  the data  come 
from Census  reports,  they differ  from the merchandise  totals reported  in 
the balance  of payments  because  they  are  unadjusted  for timing  and  cover- 
age. Furthermore,  the rise in military  sales  ($307 million  annual  rate)  and 
unclassified  exports  ($131 million annual  rate) have been excluded  from 
exports.  The growth  of unclassified  imports  was similarly  excluded  ($267 
million),  as was the decline  of noncompetitive  imports  like coffee ($127 
million)  since  these  declines  did not lead  to increases  in American  produc- 
tion. The resulting  increases  were $4.1 billion  in imports  and $3.1 billion 
in exports. 
The second  step  in the estimation  process  was  to evaluate  the number  of 
jobs lost and  jobs gained  as a result  of the trade  changes.  There  is both a 
direct  job effect  within  the trade-impacted  industry  and an indirect  effect 
in industries  supplying  inputs  to it.4  The  technical  coefficients  for both the 
direct and indirect  employment  effects  were taken from a study by the 
Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.5  This study  is based  on the 1958  input-output 
tables,  but projected  to 1970  based on trends  in productivity.  The prices 
are also on a 1958  base, which  causes  some difficulty.  One would like to 
deflate  the trade values  by indexes  of prices  of imports  and exports.  But 
since  indexes  of traded  goods of individual  industries  are  not available,  no 
adjustment  was made.  This  will tend  to bias upward  the estimates  of both 
jobs lost and  jobs gained,  but probably  will not be very  significant  on the 
net balance.6 
2. Employment  and Earnings,  Vol. 18 (July 1971). 
3. U.S. Bureau  of the Census, Highlights  of  U.S. Export  and Import  Trade, FT990 
(March 1970),  and Highlights  of Exports  and Imports,  FT990 (March 1971). 
4. Walter  S. Salant and Beatrice  N. Vaccara,  Import  Liberalization  and Employment 
(Brookings  Institution,  1961). 
5. U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Projections  1970: Interindustry  Relationships, 
Potential  Demand,  Employment,  Bulletin  1536 (1966), Table V-2. 
6. As a crude check on the direct employment  consequences,  net value added per 
employee  was calculated,  based on 1969  prices  from the Annual  Survey  of Manufactures, 
and used to estimate  the direct  employment  consequences  of trade  changes.  The results 
were not significantly  different  on balance, but they show larger absolute numbers  of 
jobs lost and jobs gained. See Bureau  of the Census, Annual  Survey  of Manufactures, 
1969: General  Statistics  for Industry  Groups  and Industries,  M69(AS)-1  (1971). u  W,  00  0  00  I'l  tn  en  N  10  M W  tWb 
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Findings 
The consequences  of the trade changes  for employment  are shown in 
Table  2. In direct  employment,  an estimated  47,800  jobs were  lost due to 
decreases  in some exports  and 134,400  jobs were lost due to increases  of 
imports,  making  a total loss of 182,200  jobs. However,  181,400  jobs were 
gained  through  increases  in exports  and a further  1,300  jobs were  created 
through  some import declines,  making  a total of 182,700  job increases. 
Thus  there  was on balance  a slight  edge toward  job creation  when direct 
employment  effects  are taken  by themselves. 
,The  inclusion  of indirect  effects  shifts the balance  slightly  toward  job 
destruction.  There  was  a net  loss of about  17,100  jobs due  to indirect  effects 
(227,600  losses, offset  in part  by 210,600  job gains).  It is reasonable  to ex- 
pect the indirect  effects  to be more unfavorable  to employment  than the 
direct  effects.  Much  of the growth  of exports  was  in agriculture  and  mining. 
In both of these  industries,  the ratio of value  added  within  the industry  to 
total sales is much  higher  than it is in manufacturing,  where  most of the 
import increases  were recorded.  Since the indirect employment  effects 
come from  that portion  of sales  value  not added  by the industry  itself,  the 
observed  differential  was to be expected. 
r,,:When  the direct  and indirect  effects  are  taken  together,  a loss of 16,600 
jobs between  1970:1  and 1971:1  can be attributed  to changes  in exports 
and imports.  If the displaced  workers  stayed  in the labor force and were 
not absorbed  into employment,  then approximately  16,600 people were 
added  to the unemployment  rolls from  this cause.  During  this span,  total 
unemployment  rose by 1.7 million  persons.  Thus  international  trade  con- 
tributed  less than 1 percent  of the increase.  To put the results  somewhat 
differently,  if unemployment  had increased  only because  of trade  disloca- 
tions, the unemployment  rate would  have risen  from 4.16 percent  to 4.18 
percent,7  rather  than  to the actual  1971:  1 average  of 5.93  percent.  The net 
job loss may appear  surprisingly  small, given the decline  in net exports. 
But it should  be remembered  that U.S. exports  are  labor-intensive  relative 
to U.S. imports, as Leontief established  and others subsequently  con- 
firmed.8  The  United  States  need  not have  balanced  increases  in exports  and 
7. Assuming  no change in the labor force. 
8. See comments  in William  H. Branson  and Helen B. Junz, "Trends  in U.S. Trade 
and Comparative  Advantage,"  this volume. i  t  R  o  F  o  on  W-4  t 
C)~~~~~~~S  C) 
V~~~~~~~~~W _^  tn  o  ens  tn 
V  Q  ?  0  t  ~~~~tn  tn an  oo oo oB 
r  2  S  2  t  t  E X  W  ff  j  tn r  Oe.I  00  0%  00S 
e^-  'W  fW't  ef0  0  'O  W1  ei  4 
M  o  t  m  N  S*  I~~~  ~  I 
T-4  ~~~~~~~~~~0 
*  *  *  NW  ..  :,1 
CO  ei  '  r i o  0%  0  0%  0  e 
06  14  1~6  C;  C  4  C 
00  4.4~~~ 
~~~0g~~~~o  ~~~~~  ~0  0 
*  *  r.=..  .  .  .  .  a  * 
*  00O O  .  ..  .0O  *  0 
0 
0 t2 
T-4  tT-4  'O  0  'O  O  e 
0 
.  0 
0..  *  -40%  *  *  O  c;~~~2v-  ce 
.C's  0 
o  E  E  l ffl,  E  8,  U  j  i  l  .  t  3 
00 
0)  la0 
'0)  0 
cd  cl~  .  .  z60w  C 424  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
imports  to maintain  employment  in trade-related  industries.  If imports 
increase  more  than exports,  as occurred  in the period  under  investigation, 
job losses may not occur. 
While  only an insignificant  portion  of total  unemployment  can  be attrib- 
uted to international  trade, the employment  situation  in particular  in- 
dustries  could  be greatly  affected.  Table  3 relates  the net direct  job changes 
due  to trade  to the employment  situation  in specific  industries.  Only  direct 
job effects  were  used  since  indirect  effects  are  spread  widely  throughout  the 
economy.  As is seen,  employment  was down  4.6 percent  in primary  metals 
(mainly steel); 2.5 percent  in motor vehicles;  and about 1.5 percent  in 
textiles.  On the other  hand,  coal mining  gained  6.6 percent  in employment; 
other transportation  equipment  (mainly aircraft),  4.4 percent;  and ma- 
chinery,  2.0 percent.  These  data  suggest  that a good case can be made  for 
adjustment  assistance  to industries  that are seriously  affected  by imports. 
However,  the imposition of import barriers  is very dangerous  since it 
usually  leads  to retaliation,  which  can  have  serious  consequences  on export 
industries.  The difficulties  imports  cause  textile  firms  are well known,  but 
little attention  is paid to the effect  on the hard-pressed  aircraft  industry  if 
it could not export. 
QUALIFICATIONS 
The interpretation  of these  findings  requires  certain  qualifications.  First, 
with  an  expanding  labor  force,  the  avoidance  ofjob destruction  is not  enough 
to ensure  full employment:  Jobs must be created  in sufficient  numbers  to 
accommodate  new  workers.  Thus,  even  though  international  trade  did not 
destroy  many  jobs on balance,  neither  did  it carry  its weight  in creating  jobs 
for the new  entrants  into the  labor  force.  Second,  even  when  the total  num- 
ber of jobs created  is equal  to the total destroyed,  if the absolute  numbers 
are  large,  frictional  unemployment  could  increase.  To establish  this point, 
the variance  of employment  due to changes  in international  trade  must  be 
compared  with  the variance  in employment  from  all other  causes,  and  this 
calculation  was not made.  Finally,  net income  flows  in the economy  were 
reduced  by $1 billion  due to the decline  in net exports  of goods, and the 
multiplier  effects  on employment  were  not estimated.  However,  these  reduc- 
tions  were  more  than  offset  by the $2.7  billion  rise  in net exports  of services 
during  the same  period.  In any event,  the multiplier  effects  would  be small 
in an economy as large as that of the United States and impossible  to 
calculate  because  expenditure  patterns  cannot  be traced. Lawrence  B. Krause  and  John  A. Mathieson  425 
Table  3. Employment,  with  and  without  Effects  of Changes  in Export  and 
Import  Trade,  by Industry  Group,  First  Quarter  1971 




due to  Potential  Job loss as 
changes  in  employment  percentage 
Average  export  and  without  of potential 
employment,  import  trade  employ- 
Industry  group  1971:  la  trade  effect  ment 
Total  74,027.2  -0.5  74,026.7  b 
Trade  related  22,536.4  -0.5  22,535.9  b 
Manufacturing  18,749.2  59.2  18,808.4  0.3% 
Durable  goods  10,100.8  33.0  10,133.8  0.3 
Primary  metals  1,255.3  60.3  1,315.6  4.6 
Fabricated  metals  1,327.7  0.0  1,327.7  ... 
Machinery  1,806.0  -34.9  1,771.1  -2.0 
Electrical  equipment  1,791.0  9.9  1,800.9  0.5 
Motor vehicles  and equipmento  879.5  22.1  901.6  2.5 
Other  transportation  equipment"  914.3  -38.4  875.9  -4.4 
Other durables  2,127.0  14.0  2,141.0  0.7 
Nondurable  goods  8,648.4  26.3  8,674.7  0.3 
Food and kindred  goods  1,781.3  -23.3  1,758.0  -1.3 
Textile mill goods  946.7  3.6  950.3  0.4 
Apparel,  finished  textiles  1,378.7  15.3  1,394.0  1.1 
Other  nondurables  4,541.7  30.7  4,572.4  0.7 
Agriculture  3,380.0  -49.6  3,330.4  -1.5 
Mining,  total  624.0  -10.1  613.9  -1.6 
Mining, trade  related  407.2  -10.1  397.1  -2.5 
Coal and related  fuelso  152.9  -9.4  143.5  -6.6 
Crude  petroleum  and natural  gas,  254.3  -0.7  253.6  -0.3 
Services  48,043.0  ...  48,043.0 
Contract construction  3,231.0  ...  3,231.0  ... 
Source: Employment  and Earnings, Vol. 18 (July 1971). Figures are rounded and may not add to totals. 
a.  Quarterly  average. 
b. Less than 0.05 percent. 
c.  Not  seasonally adjusted. 426  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
Jobs  and  Dollar  Devaluation 
One of the pillars  of the new economic  policy announced  by President 
Nixon on August  15, 1971,  was  a group  of measures  that should  lead  to the 
devaluation  of the dollar.  As noted above,  this should  improve  economic 
welfare  from international  trade, since the dollar was overvalued.  The 
devaluation  will also stimulate  U.S. exports.  Domestic employment  will 
rise as a direct  consequence  of the devaluation,  for U.S. exports  will be 
stimulated  by it, and as imports  rise in price, Americans  should switch 
consumption  toward domestically  produced  goods. It is important  to 
recognize,  however,  that the devaluation  is desirable  not to alleviate  un- 
employment,  but because  the dollar  was overvalued,  as evidenced  by the 
disequilibrium  in the overall  U.S. balance  of payments.  At full employ- 
ment,  there  will not be more  jobs because  of the devaluation,  but different 
jobs. Employment  in trade-related  industries  will be greater  and employ- 
ment in purely  domestic  industries  will be lower because  of it. The most 
fundamental  principle  of the International  Monetary  Fund is that de- 
preciation  of a currency  should  not be used to correct  an unemployment 
problem,  for that merely  exports  the unemployment  to a nondepreciating 
country,  a practice  that can lead  to competitive  devaluations  and a host of 
other  beggar-my-neighbor  policies. 
There  is an important  tie, however,  between  the timing  of a devaluation 
and the existence  of unemployment.  Devaluation  by itself is stimulative 
and inflationary.  Countries  usually  combine  devaluation  with monetary 
and  fiscal  policies  designed  to offset  the  stimulation  so as  not to lose  through 
domestic  inflation  the competitive  gain  they  achieve  via devaluation.  Given 
the current  slack  in the U.S. economy,  the stimulative  consequences  of de- 
valuation  can  be accommodated  through  greater  production,  but  the direct 
inflationary  effects  will still  be of some  concern  as the higher  U.S. prices  of 
imported  goods  raise  the price  level. 
As part  of the new economic  policy,  President  Nixon imposed  a tempo- 
rary 10 percent  import surcharge,  presumably  for the purpose  of urging 
other countries  to appreciate  their currencies  to effectuate  the dollar  de- 
valuation  the United States  seeks.  It should  be noted, however,  that the 
surcharge  interferes  with  the formulation  of a new  pattern  of exchange  rates 
via market  action since it artificially  strengthens  the dollar, as does the 
maintenance  of capital  controls.  Permanent  restrictions  on trade merely Lawrence  B. Krause  and  John  A. Mathieson  427 
maintain  an overvalued  dollar, thus sacrificing  exports  while restraining 
imports  and on balance  reducing  job opportunities  for Americans. 
Conclusion 
How much  of current  unemployment  did we import,  then?  None, appar- 
ently,  or at most an  insignificantly  small  portion.  Domestic  economic  policy 
must  take  the blame  for the overall  unemployment  situation.  Nevertheless, 
individual  industries  are greatly  affected  by shifts in trade, some losing 
employment  and  some  gaining  it. Public  policy  should  help  ease  the burden 
of adjustment  to shifts in trade as it should for other causes of unem- 
ployment. 
The proper  policy instruments  for dealing  with general  unemployment 
are monetary  and fiscal policies. Since these work best when used in 
tandem,  monetary  policy  cannot  be, as is sometimes  suggested,  separately 
targeted  for balance-of-payments  purposes-at least not without signifi- 
cant  costs. Monetary  and  fiscal  policy  must  be free  of external  constraints, 
and this can be accomplished  by keeping  exchange  rates at equilibrium 
values. Maintaining  equilibrium  will require  some flexibility  in spot ex- 
change  rates.  With equilibrium  exchange  rates,  one need  not worry  about 
the employment  effects of a declining  trade balance.  Clearly,  politicians 
must  forgo  the simplistic  but appealing  tie between  imports  and unemploy- 
ment  if a viable  international  system  is to be maintained. 
Discussion 
WALTER SALANT FOUND IT difficult to  interpret the  question  Krause 
was posing.  He felt that the issue  on the import  side was better  phrased  in 
terms  of the change  in the propensity  to import  rather  than the change  in 
the volume  of imports.  Since  real  imports  rose  despite  the recession  and  the 
great  cut in use of capacity  when  they  would  have  been  expected  to fall,  the 
actual rise in imports  understates  the rise in the propensity  to import. 
Analytically,  the Krause  approach  is similar  to the failure  to distinguish 
between  induced  and  autonomous  changes  in fiscal  policy,  using  the change 
in the actual  budget  deficit  or surplus  instead  of the change  in the full em- 428  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
ployment  budget  as an indicator.  Krause  agreed  that a measurement  of the 
shift in the import  function  would  be an interesting  exercise,  but a much 
more ambitious-and perhaps  impractical-one. 
Robert  Hall expressed  another  concern  about  the question  posed  in the 
title of the paper.  In general,  a rise in unemployment  is not matched  by a 
complementary  reduction  of employment.  In point of fact, employment 
has been essentially  on a plateau  in 1970-71,  but unemployment  rose be- 
cause  jobs did not increase  as the labor force expanded.  Secondly,  even 
in a recession,  much unemployment  is caused by people changing  jobs, 
and, as Krause showed, altered  patterns  of exports and imports  forced 
people  to change  jobs. Krause  acknowledged  these points,  noting  that his 
exercise  was intended  to refute  some invalid  claims  that were framed  in 
terms  of unemployment  and were  equally  subject  to Hall's  criticisms. 
Warren  Smith  and Charles  Bischoff  emphasized  that an adverse  shift of 
the trade balance  could have negative  secondary  effects on employment 
through  the multiplier,  even  if the primary  effect  were  zero.  The multiplier 
attaches  to the primary  change  in income,  which  is negative,  rather  than 
to the primary  change  in employment. 
Salant  wished  to qualify  Krause's  proposition  that devaluation  is not a 
proper  tool for curing  unemployment.  While  he agreed  in general,  he felt 
that, to the extent  that unemployment  is due to overvaluation  of the cur- 
rency,  restoration  of high employment  by devaluation  is preferable  to a 
cure by monetary  and fiscal expansion.  The assumption  underlying  that 
proposition  is that resource  allocation  with a proper  valuation  of the cur- 
rency  is in some  sense  optimal;  if that  assumption  is valid,  devaluation  tends 
to restore  that allocation. 